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INTRODUCTION
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ing [financial] contributions from a large number of people especially
from the online community,”1 has recently taken the financial world
by storm through the advent of websites like “Kickstarter,” “Fundable,” “IndieGogo,” “Razoo,” and “Appbackr.”2 Such websites provide
a marketplace whereby companies, small businesses, and entrepreneurs looking for startup capital can solicit funding from individual
investors.3 The concept is relatively straightforward: project creators
initiate a profile that includes informative bits like short videos, a brief
synopsis of the project, and images to further showcase the project.4
Each project has a target amount of funding to be raised, and is active
for a fixed time period, which is commonly displayed as a countdown
with an ongoing tally of funds raised.5 Ultimately, the goal of crowdfunding is to create a highly specific and unique group of like-minded
individuals from the general public, and in turn utilize that community to generate necessary capital to implement a project or even create a
business.6
The rise of crowdfunding in recent years7 has drawn attention from
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).8 On April 5, 2012,
President Barack Obama signed the JOBS Act into law, hailing it as a
“potential game changer” for small businesses and startups.9 The
JOBS Act added section 4(a)(6) to the Securities Act of 1933, and in doing so provided securities regulation exemptions for crowdfunding
sites meeting a number of basic criteria.10 Since its passing, the JOBS
Act has come under significant scrutiny for failing to provide adequate
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1. Crowdfunding,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/GTB4-K75C] (last visited Apr.
24, 2017).
2. DEBORAH GONZALEZ, MANAGING ONLINE RISK: APPS, MOBILE, AND SOCIAL MEDIA
SECURITY 200 (2015).
3. See Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit The Economy, FORBES
(Nov.
27,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-iscrowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.C.
9. Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE
PRESS
SECRETARY
(Apr.
5,
2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing
[https://perma.cc/6SP4LNLX].
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012 & Supp. 2015); GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 201.

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 202 Side A

06/19/2017 09:53:44

8 HOVESTOL-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

TO FUND OR NOT TO FUND

6/12/17 2:05 PM

1065

clarification on important considerations,11 providing overly burdensome requirements and limits on crowdfunding sites,12 and a number
of other issues.13 Scrutiny of the JOBS Act has become so pronounced
that some Republican lawmakers have led a movement for sweeping
changes to the Act, known as the “JOBS Act 2.0.”14 As a result of the
issues with the JOBS Act, coupled with a need to provide regulations
on intrastate transactions that do not fall within the jurisdiction of federal securities regulation, individual states have begun implementing
their own securities regulation exemptions for crowdfunding sites.15
Wisconsin became one of the first states to institute its own intrastate crowdfunding exemption statute,16 which passed into law as part
of 2013 Wisconsin Act 52 and became effective on June 1, 2014.17 The
Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption statute shares many common elements with the federal crowdfunding exemption,18 and runs somewhat parallel with similar exemption statutes in other states.19 How-
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11. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 202.
12. See Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Frustration Rises Over Crowdfunding Rules, WALL
S T.
J.,
Apr.
30,
2014,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579532251627028512
[https://perma.cc/TFW4-VYQL].
13. See, e.g., Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283 (2014); Tom Wentzell, Comment, The JOBS Act: Effects on Capital
Market Competition in Both Public and Private Markets, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 892, 892 (2013);
James J. Williamson, Comment, The JOBS Act and Middle-Income Investors: Why It Doesn’t Go
Far Enough, 122 YALE L.J. 2069, 2069 (2013).
14. Joseph Lawler, House Republicans Aim for JOBS Act 2.0, WASH. EXAM’R, Apr. 9, 2014,
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/house-republicans-aim-for-jobs-act2.0/article/2547013 [https://perma.cc/4CMX-RC24].
15. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 202.
16. See
Crowdfunding
in
Wisconsin,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
FIN.
INSTS,
http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/A35E-U6TB] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2017).
17. Id. For further discussion on Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption statute, see infra Part IV.
18. Compare WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016), and WIS. STAT. § 551.205 (2015–
2016), with 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
19. Wisconsin imposes similar caps on amounts received to Idaho, Indiana, and Michigan. Compare WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27), and WIS. STAT. § 551.205, with IND. CODE § 2319-2-2(27) (2015), and IDAHO CODE § 30-14-203 (2004), and In Re Treasure Valley Angel Fund,
LLC (fka Meridian Angel Fund, LLC) Request for an Order Pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-14203, BLUE SKY L. REP. 21729, 2014 WL 4063439 (2015), and MICH. COMP. LAWS.
§ 451.2202a(c)(i), (ii) (2013). Each state requires some level of registration with state regulatory bodies and notice and disclosure requirements, though the levels to which each are required differ. See Edward A. Fallone, Crowdfunding and Sport: How Soon Until the Fans Own
the Franchise?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7, 28–29 (2014).
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ever, like corresponding exemptions provided by federal law and
many state “blue sky” laws,20 Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption
falls short in key areas, including the definitions of certain classes of
investors, investment receipt caps placed on individual crowdfunding
projects, and contribution limitations placed on classes of individual
investors. Such issues severely hamper the efficacy of the Wisconsin’s
crowdfunding exemption provisions and potentially denigrate any
long-term viability of crowdfunding as a primary method of capital
generation for small businesses and startups.
This Article will explore these practical concerns and place them in
the context of other intrastate crowdfunding exemptions. Part II will
provide a brief history of crowdfunding and highlight its rise to prominence in recent years. Part III will further explain crowdfunding as a
capital-generation medium. Part IV will briefly examine the general
regulatory environment for crowdfunding, including an overview of
both federal and state law. Part V will explore key issues with Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption laws and propose a modified
framework of Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption with an eye towards the future of crowdfunding as a means of generating capital.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CROWDFUNDING
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20. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV.
347, 348 (1991).
21. Justin Kazmark, Kickstarter Before Kickstarter, THE KICKSTARTER BLOG (July 18,
2013),
https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-before-kickstarter
[https://perma.cc/3BW6-M6CK].
22. Id.; see generally HOMER, THE ILIAD (Alexander Pope trans., 1715).
23. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 199.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 199–200.
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The concept of crowdfunding is hardly a novel one. In 1713, Alexander Pope set out on a substantial project: translate the entirety of
Homer’s Iliad from Greek to English.21 The project involved six volumes, more than 15,000 lines, and took five years to complete, but
Pope was ultimately able to accomplish his goal.22 How? Pope crowdfunded the project.23 To secure necessary funding, Pope offered name
acknowledgement in the published work in exchange for a pledge of
two gold guineas, resulting in 750 subscribers and enough money to
print his translation.24
Other major historical figures have similarly relied on crowdfunding.25 World-renowned composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart once

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 203 Side A

06/19/2017 09:53:44

8 HOVESTOL-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

TO FUND OR NOT TO FUND

6/12/17 2:05 PM

1067

relied on crowdfunding in hopes of generating enough capital to perform publicly.26 In 1783, Mozart offered copies of the manuscript for
three piano concertos he composed so that he could raise the necessary
financial support to play them in Vienna.27 He did not succeed initially, but he tried again in 1784, received 176 pledges, and ultimately
raised the funding to play the concertos.28 One-hundred-and-one
years later, The New York World publisher Joseph Pulitzer raised over
$100,000 in donations from readers to provide a pedestal to display the
Statue of Liberty after the American Committee for the Statue of Liberty ran out of funding.29 In exchange for one dollar of financial support,
Pulitzer promised each donor a reward in the form of a six-inch statuette of Lady Liberty.30
The modern movement in funding known as “crowdfunding”
dates back as early as 1997, when British rock band Marillion raised
$60,000 to fund its reunion tour by soliciting online fan donations.31
Four years later, “ArtistShare” became the first official hub for online
crowdfunding.32 The website still exists to this day and seeks to “connect artists with fans in order to share the . . . creative process and
[fund] the creation of new artistic works.”33 There was little further
movement on the crowdfunding front until 2008, when IndieGogo
launched, followed by KickStarter in 2009.34 More crowdfunding sites
have jumped on the bandwagon in recent years, offering different
types of services towards different target markets.35 Since 2009, the
crowdfunding industry as a whole has grown by one thousand percent
and is now a multi-billion dollar industry with future growth likely on
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Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Kazmark, supra note 21.
See id.; Mark Feinberg, Why Donation-based Crowdfunding is Here to Stay (and Growing),
THE
CORP.
SOC.
RESP.
NEWSWIRE
(Oct.
8,
2013),
http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/1050-why-donation-based-crowdfunding-is-here-tostay-and-growing [https://perma.cc/9ZFY-9LB2].
32. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 200; Feinberg, supra note 31.
33. What
is
ArtistShare?,
ARTISTSHARE,
http://www.artistshare.com/v4/
[https://perma.cc/7V8U-CHAS] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
34. GONZALEZ, supra note 2, at 200.
35. See Sandeep Sood: The Rise of Crowdfunding, WALL ST. J.: THE ACCELERATORS, Sept.
30,
2014,
http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/09/30/sandeep-sood-the-rise-ofcrowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/4SBR-6LZE].
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the horizon.36 The takeaway is this: crowdfunding is not a new or
novel concept, but its recent explosion cannot be ignored, nor passed
off as a mere fad that will be completely extinguished in the near future.
III. CROWDFUNDING EXPLAINED
As discussed previously, crowdfunding in its most basic conceptual form is the soliciting of funding from individual donors, generally
utilizing the Internet as the means of transaction.37 However, the mechanics of crowdfunding are more nuanced, as crowdfunding exists in
multiple forms that function in different ways, in turn creating different relationships between businesses and financial contributors.38 In
all, there are three distinct types of crowdfunding: (1) donation crowdfunding; (2) reward and pre-purchase crowdfunding; and (3) debt or
equity crowdfunding.39
A. Donation Crowdfunding

C M
Y K
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36. Id.
37. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
38. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 14–27 (2012).
39. Id. at 14–15. Bradford splits “reward” and “pre-purchase” crowdfunding into two
separate categories initially, but then combines them into one. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 15; Sally Outlaw, Which Type of Crowdfunding is Best for You?, ENTREPRENEUR
(Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228524 [https://perma.cc/D34Q7D4R].
41. GOFUNDME, http://www.gofundme.com/ [https://perma.cc/A5XX-9WKQ] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2017).
42. See Outlaw, supra note 40.
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Donation crowdfunding sites, as the name suggests, offer nothing
to the donor in return for financial contributions besides a warm, fuzzy
feeling or, in some cases, a tax write-off.40 One such example is “GoFundMe,” a crowdfunding site that allows individuals to seek funding
for various causes under a plethora of categories, including “Medical,”
“Volunteer,” “Emergencies,” “Education,” and “Memorials.”41 While
donation crowdfunding sites are the simplest in nature, they are not
particularly useful for entrepreneurial efforts.42 Not many purely donation-based crowdfunding sites exist, and though donations may
fund for-profit projects, most donation crowdfunders focus on funding
requests from non-profit organizations, social causes, and political
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campaigns.43
B. Reward and Pre-Purchase Crowdfunding
Reward and pre-purchase crowdfunding are very similar in nature,
and usually appear concurrently on crowdfunding sites.44 Under the
reward model (which was classically exhibited by Pulitzer),45 a business or startup soliciting funds offers contributors something in return
for a financial contribution.46 Similarly, the pre-purchase approach allows financial contributors to purchase the product in advance of the
general public, sometimes at a discounted rate.47 Usually, the reward
model will consist of at least three levels of contributions, with higher
financial input resulting in greater rewards.48 Kickstarter and IndieGogo are two prime examples of rewards-based crowdfunding sites.49
C. Securities-Based Crowdfunding: Debt and Equity
The third major form of crowdfunding differs distinctly from donation or reward/pre-purchase crowdfunding, and creates the need for
both federal and state governments to step in and impose securities
regulations.50 In essence, equity and debt-based crowdfunding act as if
a company were offering stocks or bonds to potential investors on an
open market in connection with an ongoing business enterprise.51 In
general, such offerings are squarely within the definition of a “security” under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, which includes
in its definition of security any “note” or “stock.”52 As a result, federal
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43. Bradford, supra note 38, at 15.
44. Id. at 16.
45. See discussion supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
46. Bradford, supra note 38, at 16.
47. Id.
48. Types
of
Crowdfunding,
FUNDABLE,
http://www.fundable.com/crowdfunding101/types-of-crowdfunding
[https://perma.cc/49PF-NBBN] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
49. See
generally
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/
[https://perma.cc/L7LU-DQKN]
(last
visited
Apr.
24,
2017);
INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo.com/ [https://perma.cc/FS8U-33MA] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
50. Fallone, supra note 19, at 18.
51. See Bradford, supra note 38, at 24.
52. Fallone, supra note 19, at 18; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). Two different cases lay out the Supreme Court’s tests for what qualifies as a “stock” and what qualifies as a
“note” within the meaning of section 2(a)(1). In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681
(1985), the Supreme Court defined what a “common stock” is, relying on the prominent
characteristics security instruments commonly classified as “common stocks” all possess.
The Court focused on five main traits: (1) the right of shareholders to receive dividends; (2)
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securities regulation is required for interstate transactions, and state
securities regulation is required for intrastate transactions.53 Though
security-based crowdfunding offerings seem inexorably similar to
general offers and sales of securities via traditional mediums, they differ significantly enough to be addressed distinctly due to three main
characteristics: (1) crowdfunding offers and sales generally rely on the
use of Internet portals to promote the offers and effectuate the transactions; (2) crowdfunding offers are generally made by small, relatively
unsophisticated issuers in small monetary volumes; and (3) the level of
connection that an investor may have to the issuer, based on familial
relationships, friendships, or other interpersonal means, may be increased when compared with securities transactions performed on a
larger scale and in a more open and public context.54
1. Debt-Based Crowdfunding
In lending, or debt crowdfunding, individual crowdfunders lend
money to businesses and startups via an Internet portal set up for
crowdfunding activity.55 The business or startup then repays the
amount over time, either with interest or merely a return of the principal.56 Lending crowdfunding usually targets a different kind of consumer than donation or reward crowdfunding platforms.57 Crowdfunding Internet portals that are looking for businesses to use their
service to engage in debt-based offerings often target “restaurants, retailers, salons, gyms . . . that already have customers, already have
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negotiability; (3) the ability to pledge the instrument as collateral; (4) the conferring of voting rights to shareholders; and (5) appreciability. Id. at 686. The Supreme Court adopted a
different definition for “notes” in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), known as the
“family resemblance” test. Under the family resemblance test, any debt instrument that has
a maturity date of greater than nine months is presumed to be a security within the meaning of section 2(a)(1). Id. at 63–67. However, the presumption is rebuttable, and only holds
up if the instrument bears a family resemblance to instruments that are commonly considered notes based on a four-factor test. If the motives of purchaser, the plan of distribution,
and the public’s reasonable expectations are in line with those commonly associated with a
note, and no alternative regulatory schemes exist, then the short-term debt instrument will
almost certainly be considered a note. Id. at 66–67.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012). Though the Securities Act of 1933 instituted sweeping
securities regulation reforms, it also preserved the jurisdiction of state-level securities regulation bodies, meaning state “blue sky” laws remained in effect in certain situations where
federal law did not apply. See id.; Macey & Miller, supra note 20, at 348.
54. See Fallone, supra note 19, at 17–18.
55. Outlaw, supra note 40.
56. Bradford, supra note 38, at 20.
57. Outlaw, supra note 40.
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cash flow, and can service debt.”58 Such crowdfunding platforms may
also target companies that are “at least a year old and [have] at least a
year’s worth of receipts.”59 Thus, in lending or debt crowdfunding,
which can also be properly described as “peer-to-peer lending,”60 both
a different type of business and consumer may be the focal point of
lending-based crowdfunding platforms.
2. Equity-Based Crowdfunding
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58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Bradford, supra note 38, at 20.
61. Outlaw, supra note 40.
62. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
63. Outlaw, supra note 40.
64. Bradford, supra note 39, at 24 (“The equity model is the model that most clearly involves the sale of a security.”).
65. See generally ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/ [https://perma.cc/G7VS-W8WU] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2017); Types of Crowdfunding, FUNDABLE, http://www.fundable.com/
[https://perma.cc/2RTD-286N] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
66. See Outlaw, supra note 40.
67. See supra Part II.
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Equity crowdfunding acts just as any sale of stock, and allows
businesses and startups to sell ownership stakes via crowdfunding
sites, in turn allowing financial contributors to become investors, thus
gaining shareholder status and potentially generating a return on investment.61 While debt-based crowdfunding may or may not involve
any actual profit, depending on whether or not the debt instrument
provides for any return of interest or merely principal,62 equity crowdfunding is based on an expectation of return on investment.63 As a result, of the four types of crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding is the
most obvious model that necessarily involves securities.64 Crowdfunding sites active in the United States that offer equity-based models
include AngelList and Fundable.65 The development of equity crowdfunding in particular has led to the need for securities regulations and
brought about the crowdfunding-specific sections of the JOBS Act,
along with further state regulations.66 Both debt and equity crowdfunding offerings and sales ultimately exhibit classic properties of
transactions that are considered squarely within the realm of activity
that must be regulated under federal and state law, even if they have
unique characteristics relative to more traditional concepts of stock
and debt offerings.67
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IV. CURRENT CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTIONS
To fully understand the benefit offered by Wisconsin’s intrastate
crowdfunding regulation exemption laws, it is first important to understand the overarching framework of securities regulation, including
the interplay between federal and state requirements, and the benefits
that exemption from registration provide. Securities regulation in its
skeletal function works as follows: any entity making an offering that
meets the definition of a “security” must ordinarily register that security with SEC.68 However, there are exceptions from federal registration. For example, if the security in question is only offered, sold, and
transferred to investors within a single state, then that offering may be
considered “intrastate” and be eligible for federal exemption under
section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933.69 However, exemption
from federal registration does not preclude all potential registration
requirements.70 Where an issuer is exempt from registration with the
SEC under federal law, it still must find a state exemption to be exempt from registration with the state regulatory bodies where securities are offered or sold.71 Thus, where a Wisconsin issuer is able to rely

06/19/2017 09:53:44

C M
Y K

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 205 Side B

68. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (providing a number of interests and instruments
that qualify as securities under federal law); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2012).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012 & Supp. 2015) (“Any security which is part of an issue
offered and sold to only persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer
of such security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.”). It should be noted that a section 3(a)(11) exemption can be destroyed even after the issuer’s offering and sale is complete. Bryn Vaaler, Financing a Small Business In Mississippi: A Practitioner’s Guide to Federal
and State Securities Exemptions Part II, 63 MISS. L.J. 267, 306–22 (1994). For example, where a
purchaser of an intrastate issuer’s security resells the security to an out-of-state purchaser,
and the security has not “come to rest,” that resale may be integrated with the original issuing, meaning that the section 3(a)(11) exemption would be destroyed. Id. at 321–22; 17
C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (2013) (providing that the section 3(a)(11) exemption does not apply
where any resale of a security as part of a 3(a)(11) offering is made to an out-of-state resident within a nine month period from the date of the last sale of securities as part of the offering); Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 656–57 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a resale of
securities to an out-of-state resident within seven months after the last security as part of an
intrastate issuing may not destroy the section 3(a)(11) exemption where the initial sales
were “bona fide”).
70. See
Small
Business
and
the
SEC,
SEC.
AND
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm [https://perma.cc/97QT-S775] (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (“If your company is selling securities, it must comply with both federal
regulations and state securities laws and regulations in the states where securities are offered and sold . . . A particular offering exempt under the federal securities laws is not necessarily exempt from any state laws.”).
71. For an extended discussion of the interplay between federal and state crowdfunding exemptions, see Fallone, supra note 19, at 22–31.
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on the intrastate exemption to avoid federal registration, it still must
find an exemption under Wisconsin state law to be fully exempt from
all securities registration requirements under both federal and state
law.72
The primary advantage of exemption from registration can be substantial, especially for small business owners who lack the funds and
resources of a large corporation.73 Absent an exemption, issuers must
create and submit extensive disclosures containing highly-detailed information about the issuer’s financials, operations, products, and business activities.74 The disclosures must be both accurate and complete,
and producing the necessary registration and disclosure materials requires a significant amount of due diligence efforts by specialized lawyers and investment bankers.75 The fees associated with employing a
law firm and an investment banking firm will undoubtedly be high,
and would naturally serve to prevent many potential small issuers
from making any sort of offering due to a lack of resources.76 Additionally, registration and other filing fees can be a major problem for
potential crowdfunding issuers.77 Without an exemption, issuers must
file both with the SEC and state regulatory bodies in each state where
securities are offered or sold.78 Since crowdfunding issuers primarily
use Internet portals to offer and sell the securities, the offering will
very likely be construed as an offer or sale to each and every state, thus
requiring registration in all fifty states.79 As a result, many businesses
who would consider using crowdfunding as a means to generate capital not only would prefer an exemption, but absolutely must have one
to be able to raise funds via crowdfunding.

Before tackling Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption specifically,
a brief look at federal and state crowdfunding regulations is useful to
provide context on the overarching body of crowdfunding regulations

C M
Y K
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72. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(b) (2015–2016) (expressly requiring an issuer to be
exempt under section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 in order to qualify for the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption).
73. Fallone, supra note 19, at 19.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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in the United States broadly. Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of
1933 provides the federal exemption from registration with the SEC in
qualifying crowdfunding offerings.80 In addition to the federal exemption, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have passed
crowdfunding exemptions relating to specifically intrastate transactions.81 Seven more states have crowdfunding exemption legislation
pending, and four states have rejected proposed crowdfunding exemptions.82
Though the specifics vary to some degree, the essence of the
crowdfunding exemptions across state and federal law are very similar. Most states follow Congress’s lead, and have instituted a flat,
$1,000,000 cap on amounts received via crowdfunding in any twelvemonth period.83 Others, including Wisconsin, allow for up to
$2,000,000 under certain conditions.84 In addition, federal law and
many state laws limit the amounts that an individual investor may
contribute to a crowdfunding offering in any twelve-month period.85
Further, similar to federal law, each state requires issuers to register
with the state regulatory authority before making any offers or sales to
the public and make certain disclosures available to potential investors.86 Some states go so far as to require the dissemination of quarterly reports to investors regarding the company and its financial performance.87 However, many other states’ crowdfunding exemptions

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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80. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012 & Supp. 2015).
81. Anthony J. Zeoli, State of the States – List of Current Active and Proposed Intrastate
Crowdfunding
Exemptions,
CROWDFUNDING
LEGAL
HUB
COM,
http://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2015/01/16/state-of-the-states-list-of-current-activeand-proposed-intrastate-exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/T6XU-G2WK] (last updated Oct.
2016).
82. Id.
83. Fallone, supra note 19, at 29. Compare WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016), and
WIS. STAT. § 551.205 (2015–2016), with IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 3014-203 (2014), and In Re Treasure Valley Angel Fund, LLC (fka Meridian Angel Fund, LLC)
Request for an Order Pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-14-203, BLUE SKY L. REP. 21729 (C.C.H.),
2014 WL 4063439 (2015), and MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 451.2202a(c)(i), (ii) (2016).
84. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016); IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2016).
85. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)–(27) (2015–2016); IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2 (2016);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 451.2202 (2016).
86. Fallone, supra note 19, at 29.
87. Indiana, Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin are among the states that require
the dissemination of quarterly reports for issuers utilizing a crowdfunding exemption. Fallone, supra note 19, at 29; IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(P) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 451.2022(b)(iv); WASH REV. CODE. § 21.20.880(3) (2014); WIS. STAT. § 551.205(2) (2015–
2016).
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are silent regarding any ongoing disclosure requirements.88 While the
most basic tenants of the crowdfunding exemptions instituted across
state laws and federal law are very similar, Wisconsin’s crowdfunding
exemption is somewhat unique in its overall requirements.89 Nevertheless, the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption is burdened by many
of the same deficiencies present in the broad body of crowdfunding
regulation in the broad body of United States law at both the federal
and state levels.
B. Wisconsin’s Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemption
Wisconsin’s intrastate crowdfunding exemption lessens the burden
on businesses seeking to offer a securities-based crowdfunding model
to consumers, but nevertheless imposes limitations on amounts received and filing requirements to provide sufficient notice to investors
and the state in the hopes of protecting potentially unsophisticated investors from making poor investment decisions or from being victims
of fraudulent sales of securities.90 Under Wisconsin law, “[a]n offer or
sale of a security by an issuer” is exempted from regulation under the
Wisconsin Uniform Securities Act if: (1) “[t]he issuer of the security is a
business entity organized under [Wisconsin law] and authorized to do
business in [Wisconsin]”;91 (2) the transaction is an intrastate offering
within the federal exemption for intrastate offerings;92 and (3) the offering of securities “is made exclusively through one or more Internet
sites and each Internet site is registered with the division under
§ 551.205(1)(b).”93
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88. Fallone, supra note 19, at 29.
89. See supra notes 83 and 84.
90. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 279, 280 (2000) (noting the general goal of protecting investors in creating regulatory
schemes governing the securities markets).
91. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(a).
92. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.147
(2013).
93. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(e). In addition to Wisconsin, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Texas all maintain an Internet-only requirement in their respective crowdfunding exemptions. Id.; IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(O)
(2014); IOWA CODE § 502.202(24)(a)(1), (e) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.411(1)(r) (LexisNexis 2015); MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.461(1)(b), (3)(3) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-14-2.04(C)
(2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111(24)(a)(xii) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. 49:3-50(b)(14)(v) (2015); 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25(d) (2015). The District of Columbia has additional provisions in
its crowdfunding exemption dealing with Internet broker-dealers, but does not place a flat
requirement that all issuers using its crowdfunding exemption must offer and sell through
an Internet portal. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 26-B, §§ 250.1, 250.2, 256.1 (2014). Likewise, Illi-
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In addition to those basic requirements, the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption scheme has two key components: (1) a hard cap on
amounts received in a twelve-month period and limits on amounts
that particular investors can contribute in a twelve-month period;94
and (2) notice filed with the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions (“WDFI”).95
1. Cap on Amounts Received
Like under federal law96 and other states’ regulations,97 Wisconsin
limits the amount of contribution an exclusively intrastate crowdfunding platform can receive in a twelve-month period.98 Under Wisconsin
law, a business may only receive up to either $1,000,000 or $2,000,000
via crowdfunding offerings and sales in a twelve-month period.99
Whether the cap is $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 depends on whether the issuer has undergone a financial audit of its most recently completed fiscal year and made the audit available to each prospective investor and
the administrator of the division of securities in the WDFI.100 If the issuer has undergone a financial audit of its most recently completed fiscal year and provided proper disclosure to prospective investors and
the WDFI, the stepped-up $2,000,000 cap will be imposed.101 If the issuer has failed to fulfill either of the two requirements, the baseline
$1,000,000 cap will be imposed.102
Two important caveats apply to the cap regardless of whether it is
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nois, Massachusetts, and Oregon contemplate that Internet portals may be used to facilitate
crowdfunding offerings, but stop short of imposing the same requirement that Indiana and
Wisconsin do.
See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4(T) (2016); 950 MASS. CODE REGS.
14.402(B)(13)(o) (2014); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0080(7), 441-035-0090(3)(b) (2015).
94. See WIS. STAT. §§ 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b).
95. See id. §§ 551.202(26)(f)–(n).
96. The SEC’s crowdfunding regulation was adopted on October 30, 2015. SEC Adopts
Rules to Permit Crowdfunding: Proposes Amendments to Existing Rules to Facilitate Intrastate and
Regional Securities Offerings.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [https://perma.cc/G6FU-M9AP]
[hereinafter Proposed SEC Amendments to Existing Crowdfunding Rules]. Further changes
have been proposed to raise the overall cap on amounts received from $1,000,000 to
$5,000,000. Id.
97. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
98. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also WIS. STAT. § 551.102(1m) (2015–2016) (“‘Administrator’ means the administrator of the division of securities in the department of financial institutions.”).
101. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(b) (2015–2016).
102. Id. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a).
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$1,000,000 or $2,000,000 for any issuer. First, the current cap is subject
to adjustment under Wis. Stat. § 551.206.103 As a result, the WDFI will
adjust the monetary amounts specified in both caps “to reflect changes
since January 1, 2014, in the consumer price index for all urban consumers, Milwaukee-Racine area average, as determined by the U.S.
department of labor,” round the caps to the nearest multiple of
$50,000, and provide notice on the WDFI website.104 Thus, the caps
could either increase or decrease depending on the consumer price index at five-year intervals.
Second and more importantly, the cap could shrink for an issuer if
the issuer has sold securities within twelve months before the first offer or sale made in reliance on the crowdfunding exemption.105 In essence, the provision is backward-looking and lowers the cap on an issuer by the sum of all securities sold in reliance on the crowdfunding
exemption before the point at which the issuer made the current sale
relying on the exemption.106 This limitation is potentially significant,
as an issuer that wants to make a successive offering utilizing the
crowdfunding exemption within a twelve-month period will have an
even lower cap due to the integration imposed by Wis. Stat.
§§ 551.202(c)(1)(a) or (b).107 Thus, depending on which cap applies, if
an issuer sold $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 worth securities as part of a
crowdfunding offering in the twelve-month window before a subsequent offering purporting to fall within the crowdfunding exemption,
it will be prohibited from utilizing the crowdfunding exemption until
the twelve-month look-back period has passed.

In addition to limiting total amounts issuers can receive in a
twelve-month period, Wisconsin imposes strict limitations on investors, subject to an important potential exemption. There is no limit on
the number of investors an issuer can take in, but there are limitations
on individual investors.108 Ordinarily under Wisconsin law, any single
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103. Id. §§ 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (explaining that the amount of either cap is “subject
to adjustment under § 551.206”).
104. WIS. STAT. § 551.206 (2015–2016).
105. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016).
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See Crowdfunding in Wisconsin, Frequently Asked Questions, WIS. DEPT. OF FIN.
INSTS.,
http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/faqCrowdfunding.htm
[https://perma.cc/VH5L-7AQH] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
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109. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(d) (2015–2016).
110. Id.
111. WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016).
112. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(13)(am) (2015–2016).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013). For a full list of what qualifies as an “accredited investor” under federal law, see Rule 501(a). It should be noted that a person’s primary residence is generally not included in the net worth calculation, subject to the exception provided in 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(ii). 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i).
114. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(a)–(b) (2015–2016).
115. Id. § 551.202(26)(c). Interestingly, Wisconsin does not expressly provide that institutional investors are exempt from the $10,000 per-investor limit, as accredited and certified
investors are. Since all three are expressly accounted for in § 551.202(26)(c)(1), and yet institutional investors are not referred to directly below in § 551.262(26)(d), it is reasonable to
presume that an institutional investor would have to qualify as an accredited investor to be
exempt from the $10,000 per-investor limit.

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 208 Side B

investor is not allowed to contribute more than $10,000 to any issuer.109
However, the $10,000 limit is removed if the investor is considered an
“accredited investor” or a “certified investor.”110
In Wisconsin, a “certified investor” must be a resident of the state
of Wisconsin, and at the time of an offer or sale of securities, must have
either: (1) “an individual net worth, or joint net worth with the individual’s spouse, of at least $750,000”; or (2) “an individual income in
excess of $100,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income
with the individual’s spouse in excess of $150,000 in each of those
years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income
level in the current year.”111 “Accredited investors” are defined in
Wisconsin as they are in Rule 501(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.112
Under Rule 501(a), accredited investors include the following: banks;
savings and loan institutions; brokers and dealers of securities; private
business development companies; retirement or employee benefit
plans with assets in excess of $5,000,000; trusts with assets in excess of
$5,000,000; “[a]ny director, executive officer, or general partner of the
issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive
officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer”; and natural persons with an individual or joint net worth greater than
$1,000,000.113 On top of having no per-investor limitation on contributions to any single offering, funds raised via certified and accredited
investors and any contributions from such investors do not count
against the overall cap on issuers’ receipts in a twelve-month period.114
In addition, funds received from “institutional investors” do not
count against the aggregate cap.115 “Institutional investors” involve a
wide array of finance and banking institutions, along with other finan-
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cial and banking professionals and advisers.116 In essence, Wisconsin
imposes a hard aggregate cap on amounts received from “ordinary”
investors, but removes any limitations on amounts received from investors attaining a certain status.117 Thus, issuers relying on the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption have a potentially unlimited aggregate cap, depending on whether or not accredited or certified investors
decide to purchase securities through the offering.118
3. Notice Requirements under the Crowdfunding Exemption
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116. For a complete definition of what comprises an “institutional investor,” see WIS.
STAT. § 551.102(11) (2015–2016). Wisconsin also exempts from the aggregate cap any sales
to officers, directors, partners, trustees, or individuals “occupying similar status or performing similar functions with respect to the issuer or to a person owning [ten] percent or more
of the outstanding shares of any class or classes of securities of the issuer.” WIS. STAT.
§ 551.202(26)(c)(2) (2015–2016).
117. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26) (2015–2016).
118. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1) (2015–2016).
119. WIS. STAT. § 551.205 (2014–2015).
120. Id. § 551.205(1)(a).
121. Id. § 551.205(1)(b)(1).
122. Id.
123. Id. § 551.205(1)(b)(2), (4).
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In addition to strict caps on amounts received through crowdfunding involving the offer or sale of securities, Wisconsin provides additional requirements that must be fulfilled before any offer or sale occurs if issuers want to claim the Wisconsin crowdfunding
exemption.119 First, the issuer must provide evidence that it is organized under Wisconsin law and authorized to do business in Wisconsin to the operator of the Internet portal the issuer will use to conduct
the crowdfunding offer or sale.120 Second, the Internet site operator of
the portal used to offer or sell the securities must file a registration
statement with the WDFI that includes the following: that the operator
is a business entity organized under Wisconsin law and authorized to
do business in Wisconsin; that the site is being used to offer and sell
securities under the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption; the identity
of, location of, and contact information for the operator; and potentially, that the operator is registered as a broker-dealer under Wis. Stat.
§ 551.401.121
Generally, the Internet site operator will have to state that it is registered as a broker-dealer under Wis. Stat. § 551.401.122 However, there
are two exceptions to this general rule.123 First, the exception under
§ 551.205(1)(b)(2) provides an operator will not have to register where
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it meets all of a series of eight prerequisites: (1) it does not offer investment advice or recommendations; (2) it does not solicit any purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities available on its portal; (3) it
does not compensate any employees, agents, or others for solicitation
or based on sales of securities on its portal; (4) it is not compensated
based on securities sold, and it does not hold, manage, or possess investor funds or securities; (5) its fee charged to issuers is fixed, variable
based on how long the securities are offered, or some combination
therein; (6) it does not engage in advertising that specifically identifies,
promotes, or otherwise refers to any individual securities offered; (7) it
does not engage in any other activity that the WDFI determines is prohibited; and (8) neither it, nor any party with management authority, is
subject to any action specified in Rule 506(d)(1) of the Securities Act of
1933 that would disqualify an issuer from the broker-dealer exemption.124 Second, the exception under § 551.205(1)(b)(4) provides that
where a Wisconsin Internet site operator is registered federally as a
broker-dealer, it will not have to in Wisconsin as well.125
In addition to pre-offer or sale requirements, issuers and Internet
site operators have duties that apply following the commencement of
the offering.126 First, both the issuer and the Internet site operator
must “maintain records of all offers and sales of securities effected”
done through the Internet site and must provide “ready access” to the
WDFI upon request.127 Second, issuers must provide free, quarterly
reports to their investors until no securities issued under the crowd-
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124. Id. Rule 506(d)(1) actions involve the “‘Bad Actor’ disqualification,” which disqualifies an issuer from making an offering under Rules 506(b) and (c) of Regulation D “if
the issuer or any other person covered by Rule 506(d) has a relevant criminal conviction,
regulatory or court order or other disqualifying event” that happened on or after September
23, 2013—the effective date of the most recent amendments to Rule 506. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(d)(1), (2) (2013); Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings and Related Disclosure Requirements: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/bad-actor-smallentity-compliance-guide.htm [https://perma.cc/6LC6-VQQC]. Rule 506(d) extends to all
“covered persons,” which includes the issuer and any predecessors and affiliates; the issuer’s executive officers, directors, general partners, and managing members; twenty-percent
beneficial owners of the issuer by total voting power; promoters connected to the issuer;
fund investment managers if the issuer is a pooled investment fund; and all persons compensated for soliciting investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1); Disqualification of Felons and Other
“Bad Actors”, supra.
125. WIS. STAT. § 551.205(1)(b)(4) (2015–2016).
126. See generally id. § 551.205.
127. Id. § 551.205(1)(c).
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funding exemption are outstanding.128 The issuer may satisfy the
quarterly reporting requirement by making the information available
on an Internet site so long as “the information is made available within
[forty-five] days after the end of each fiscal quarter and remains available until the succeeding quarterly report is issued.”129 In addition, the
issuer must file each quarterly report with the WDFI and provide a
written copy of any report made available online to any investor upon
the WDFI’s request.130
Wisconsin also imposes content requirements on each quarterly report.131 Each report must set forth the cash compensation each director
and executive officer received since the previous quarterly report,
along with any “bonuses, stock options, other rights to receive securities of the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer, or other compensation
received” on an annual basis.132 Further, the issuer’s management
must provide analysis of the issuer’s business operations, along with
its financial condition.133 As reflected by Wis. Stat. § 551.205, exemption from having to go through the full securities registration process
does not preclude all disclosure requirements.134 Issuers that seek the
crowdfunding exemption and the operators of the sites they use as
portals to conduct the offerings and sales nevertheless have burdens to
provide certain, albeit limited, levels of documentation, notice, and information to the WDFI, each other, and investors.135
V. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES WITH THE WISCONSIN CROWDFUNDING
EXEMPTION AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES

Id. § 551.205(2).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 551.205(2)(a)–(b).
Id. § 551.205(2)(a).
Id. § 551.205(2)(b).
Id. § 551.205(2).
Id.
See Anthony Zeoli, State of the States: An Update on Intrastate Crowdfunding,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/09/51187state-states-update-intrastate-crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/B3SR-6T5U].
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Despite the buzz that the crowdfunding movement has generated
nationwide, it has not caught on in Wisconsin when it comes to specifically intrastate offerings.136 As of April 2017, only five Internet crowdfunding portals have registered with the WDFI, and none have since
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February 5, 2015.137 Further, only ten issuers have filed for the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption under Wis. Stat. § 551.205(26).138
Such a lack of activity begs the question: why are more Internet portals
and issuers not utilizing the Wisconsin crowdfunding exemption?
Perhaps a lack of general public awareness of both the exemption itself
and the potential for capital generation via crowdfunding is the
cause,139 or perhaps some other extrinsic factors are present that are
hampering the development of crowdfunding on an intrastate level.140
Regardless of any extrinsic factors, latent deficiencies in the regulatory scheme itself at minimum serve to create barriers to entry into the
market that may deter Wisconsin businesses from attempting to utilize
the exemption and make a crowdfunding offering. In response, Wisconsin should modify its crowdfunding exemption in a manner that
would make crowdfunding a more attractive capital generation medium while maintaining investor protections that are at the heart of securities regulation. First, it should rework its current two-tier system
of investor classes into a three-tiered system with revised definitions
applying to each class in a manner that more narrowly and accurately
protects certain types of investors.141 Second, it should apply a different cap to each respective tier in a manner that increases the overall
amount of potential capital available to crowdfunding issuers while
maintaining adequate protections for investors that lack sophistication
and/or wealth.142 Third, it should maintain its current notice and disclosure requirements, as they become even more essential with the increased stakes for investors brought about by the cap increases.143

In attempting to distinguish between investors who require more
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137. Internet Site Operator Registration Statements, WIS. DEPT. OF FIN. INSTS.,
https://www.wdfi.org/apps/Crowdfunding/ISO [https://perma.cc/BV3Q-G5EV] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2017).
138. DFI Crowdfunding Exempt Offerings, WIS. DEPT. OF FIN. INSTS.,
https://www.wdfi.org/apps/Crowdfunding/Exemption [https://perma.cc/L6AP-XBC4]
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017).
139. See Zeoli, supra note 136 (suggesting one of the causes of the general lack of intrastate crowdfunding activity nationwide is the general public’s lack of awareness and understanding of crowdfunding, along with an overall skepticism of the medium).
140. Id. (suggesting some intrastate funding legislation has not passed due to outside
factors such as misunderstanding of the bill itself, or attempts to bundle the proposals).
141. See infra Part V.A.
142. See infra Part V.B.
143. See infra Part V.C.
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144. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c) (2015–2016); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
145. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c) (2015–2016); WIS. STAT.§ 551.102(4m), (11) (2015–2016).
146. WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(d) (2015–2016).
147. See generally Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009).
148. See WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016) (defining “certified investors”); 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a) (2013) (defining “accredited investors”).
149. See Finger, supra note 148, at 733–34.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See WIS. STAT. § 551.102(11) (2015–2016) (providing Wisconsin’s definition of “in-
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protection and those who do not, Wisconsin incorporates the federal
definition of “accredited investor” under Rule 501(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, and exempts any funds received from such investors from
applying against the aggregate cap on amounts received in a twelvemonth period under the exemption.144 In addition, Wisconsin defines
and incorporates “institutional investors” and “certified investors” into the exemption against the cap along with accredited investors.145
Further, Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption applies no per-investor
limit regarding accredited and certified investors.146
The fundamental problem with Wisconsin’s creation of a separate
range of investors to whom no limits apply is similar to the issues present in the comparable class of investors under federal law.147 Wisconsin ties its elevated class of investors in large part to net worth or yearly income,148 which is problematic because individuals with a large net
worth or high yearly income level may still be novice investors who
lack the sophistication to make intelligent, fully informed investment
decisions.149 In fact, it is entirely possible that an individual with a relatively low net worth or income level who would not qualify as part of
the elevated class may possess significantly more sophistication regarding investments than an individual who qualifies as an accredited
or certified investor.150 In other words, just because a particular investor has the funds to qualify as an “accredited” or “certified” investor, it
does not necessarily follow that they should escape per-investor limitations under a regulatory scheme.151
Rather, Wisconsin should rework its definition of certain types of
investors under its crowdfunding exemption, and create three tiers of
investors. Under a revised framework, Wisconsin would first create a
new class of investors, known as “qualified investors.” The definition
of a qualified investor would include three classes of investors: (1) institutional investors,152 (2) “any director, executive officer, or general
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partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that
issuer,”153 and (3) certain individual investors who are natural persons
who possess sufficient “knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters [to evaluate] the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.”154 Such a definition would incorporate the federal definition of a “sophisticated” investor,155 and will not be tied to net worth or
yearly income levels, as it is presumable that neither institutional investors, nor individuals possessing the requisite sophistication to make
sound, informed investment decisions will require the protections that
common investors need.156
Naturally, creating a tier based upon facially qualitative and potentially ambiguous criteria such as “sophistication” requires some level
of assessment and verification to be practically feasible and capable of
implementation.157 Wallis K. Finger’s “licensing scheme” provides an
effective example of how to identify properly sophisticated versus unsophisticated investors.158 Under a scheme similar to Finger’s, Wisconsin would make a test available to investors seeking “qualified” status.
Such a test would assess the investor’s knowledge of basic business
principles, private and public offerings, issuers and purchasers, practical considerations in making informed investment decisions, and ele-
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stitutional investor”).
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2013). Incorporating this aspect of Rule 501(a) into
the definition of “qualified investor” captures the other subset of natural persons that might
be considered accredited investors. See id. § 230.501(a)(5) (providing for persons whose individual or joint net worth exceeds $1,000,000 to be considered accredited investors); id.
§ 230.501(a)(6) (counting any natural person with “an individual income in excess of
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person’s spouse in
excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the
same income level in the current year” as an accredited investor). Including Rule 501(a)(5)
and (6) into the definition of qualified investors is inadvisable, because the goal of the proposed framework is to only remove all limitations on investments based upon sophistication, as opposed to mere net worth or income levels.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2013). Rule 506 provides for no aggregate investment
cap where the purchasers are sophisticated, though it does limit the number of sophisticated purchasers in any offering to 35. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i), (ii); see also Finger, supra note 148,
at 759–61 (proposing a licensing system for federal securities law whereby investors would
have to pass one of two tests to show a sufficient level of knowledge and sophistication to
be considered “licensed”).
155. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2013).
156. See generally Finger, supra note 148.
157. See id. at 759–60.
158. Id. at 759–66.
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159. See id. at 762.
160. See id. at 763 (suggesting ongoing educational courses as a requirement to maintaining what he calls “licensed” investor status).
161. Id. at 765.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 763–64.
164. See id. at 765–66 (addressing potential issues that may arise under a testing system
to evaluate investors’ knowledge and sophistication).
165. See WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016).
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mentary principles of securities regulations.159 To ensure that investors maintain the level of knowledge and sophistication necessary to
be a qualified investor, either a new test should be periodically administered to each investor who holds qualified status (perhaps at five to
ten year intervals), or maintaining qualified status should be conditioned on taking periodic educational courses to ensure the requisite
level of knowledge and sophistication is maintained.160
As Finger points out, one potential criticism for such a requirement
is the administrative costs that would result, including expenses associated with designing the exam, creating testing centers, buying testing
computers, and hiring individuals to proctor the exams.161 Additionally, there could be investor-side costs, including paying a testing fee,
and paying to take preparatory classes.162 Moreover, an exam-based
system would not be free from error, and may from time-to-time bar a
truly sophisticated investor from attaining qualified status or allow an
unsophisticated investor to attain qualified status.163 Though a testing
system would doubtlessly be imperfect and would require time and
effort to iron out the initial problems that inevitably rise with such initiatives, it is nevertheless a more effective system than currently in
place, and will serve to help better identify investors that truly are capable of making the kinds of informed investment decisions such that
no investor protections in terms of aggregate caps on amounts received or per-investor caps on amounts invested need apply.164
Below the tier of qualified investors would sit the second tier,
which would contain “certified investors” and incorporate the definition of certified investors currently in place under Wisconsin law.165
Certified investors would be natural persons who do not meet the definition of qualified investors, are Wisconsin residents, and have: (1) an
individual or joint net worth exceeding $750,000; (2) an individual
yearly income exceeding $100,000 in the two most recent years; or (3) a
joint yearly income with his or her spouse exceeding $150,000 in the
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two most recent years.166 Since Wisconsin’s definition of “certified investor” looks at both individual or joint net worth and individual or
joint income levels going back two years,167 and has a lower threshold
for both net worth and income when compared with the federal definition of “accredited investor,”168 each and every individual that qualified as an accredited investor under Rule 501(a)(5) and (6) would qualify as a certified investor under Wisconsin law.169 Thus, there is no
need for a separate class of “individual accredited investors” under the
proposed framework, and simply defining the entire second tier as
“certified investors” will suffice. In essence, the second tier can be
thought of as “non-qualified investors, plus.” Individuals that are certified investors will not have the knowledge and sophistication required to be considered a qualified investor, but nevertheless possess a
high level of net worth or income that allows them to fiscally handle a
greater level of investment risk than common investors.
The third and final tier is already in place under the current regulatory framework, and works as a catchall that includes all persons who
are not qualified investors or certified investors.170 As a result, any individual investors that do not meet the sophistication requirements to
be considered qualified investors, do not have a joint or individual net
worth of $750,000, do not have an individual yearly income in excess
of $100,000 in the past two years, and do not have a joint yearly income in excess of $150,000 in the past two years necessarily will fall
within the bottom tier.171
Creating a three-tier system for classifying investors under Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption provides the foundation for increases
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166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (2013), with WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–
2016).
169. See discussion supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. Wisconsin’s monetary
thresholds to be a “certified investor” are $250,000 lower than the federal definition of “accredited investor” when it comes to individual or joint net worth, $100,000 lower in terms of
individual yearly income for the previous two years, and $150,000 lower regarding joint
yearly income for the previous two years. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (2013), with
WIS. STAT. § 551.102(4m) (2015–2016). As a result, every “certified investor” and “accredited investor” overlap, and the only part of the federal definition of accredited investor that
needs to be included in the proposed definition of “qualified investor” is the provision
found in Rule 501(a)(4). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2013).
170. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)–(d) (2015–2016).
171. This operates the same as the current crowdfunding exemption, except for the
addition of a third class of investors. See id.
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in the aggregate cap on total amounts of capital raised in any given
crowdfunding offering. In essence, providing for a tiered classification
of investors that is significantly more focused than the current system
allows for a more accurate advancement of the primary policy function
served by investor protection under securities laws.172 By narrowing
the class of investors whose contributions are excluded from the aggregate cap, Wisconsin will be able to eliminate limits on investors
where they are truly warranted and apply limitations where they are
legitimately required.
B. Raising the Cap on Amounts Received Under the Three-Tier System
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172. See Choi, supra note 90, at 280.
173. Anthony Zeoli, The Illinois Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemption: The Reasoning Behind
LEGAL
HUB
(Nov.
8,
2014),
the
Bill,
CROWDFUNDING
http://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2014/11/08/the-illinois-intrastate-crowdfundingexemption-the-reasoning-behind-the-bill/ [https://perma.cc/JQE7-CCPE].
174. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (2015); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2013) (imposing limited disclosure requirements on issuers making offerings qualifying under Regulation D).
175. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3; WIS. STAT. § 551.205(1), (2) (2015–2016).
176. See Steven Skolnick & Alan Wovsaniker, The JOBS Act: Improving Access to Capital
Markets for Smaller Businesses, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW: LEADING LAWYERS
ON UNDERSTANDING IMPORTANT LEGISLATION AND COMPLYING WITH SEC RULES AND
REGULATIONS (INSIDE THE MINDS) 5 (2016 ed.) (noting the generally expensive nature of filing quarterly reports because of the due diligence efforts required to ensure the complete-
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Working in conjunction with a three-tiered classification of investors is a three-tiered cap system, premised first on raising the overall
amount of capital that companies may raise through a crowdfunding
offering in Wisconsin. Though the hard cap of $1,000,000 or $2,000,000
may seem like a relatively generous number that provides ample opportunity to raise a significant amount of money, the cap itself may not
be high enough, which may serve to dissuade businesses from attempting to use crowdfunding.173 Other exemptions, such as Rule 505
of Regulation D under federal securities law, allow for up to $5,000,000
to be raised in a twelve-month period without significant disclosure
requirements.174 Even if an issuer is exempt under the Wisconsin
crowdfunding exemption, it still must submit an initial disclosure to
the Internet portal it uses, and more significantly, must issue quarterly
reports to investors.175 The costs associated with such submissions will
undoubtedly be above the level of “negligible,” and could make
crowdfunding a less attractive option than a private offering once costs
are factored in in juxtaposition with the cap on funds raised imposed
by Wisconsin law.176

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 213 Side B

06/19/2017 09:53:44

8 HOVESTOL-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1088

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/12/17 2:05 PM

[100:1063

C M
Y K

06/19/2017 09:53:44

ness and accuracy of each quarterly report).
177. See Finger, supra note 148, at 733–34 (highlighting the incongruous result that occurs when the federal definition of accredited investor includes wealthy individuals with
no sophistication and excludes people with substantial sophistication who fail to meet the
net worth or income tests).
178. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1) (2015–2016).
179. Rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933 provides for an unlimited cap on investments received as part of a Rule 506 offering, so long as two requirements
are fulfilled: (1) there are no more than thirty-five unaccredited, but sophisticated investors
in the offering; and (2) all other investors are accredited. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)–(c) (2013).
180. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016) (imposing a split cap depending on whether or not the issuer has undergone a financial audit of its most recently completed fiscal year that meets general accounting standards).
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As part of the proposed framework, the top tier, containing qualified investors, would have no cap on aggregate amounts raised via a
crowdfunding offering, no cap on amounts contributed by any one
qualified investor, and no limitation on the number of qualified investors that would participate in any crowdfunding offering. In essence,
the first tier is “wide open,” as investors that are institutional or individuals possessing a high level of business, financial, and investment
sophistication should be able to invest as much as they want in an offering of securities without the need for regulatory protection.177
Though doing so creates a potentially unlimited cap on funds that may
be raised through a crowdfunding offering, it is no different than Wisconsin’s current regulatory scheme, besides applying a narrower definition of who qualifies as part of the unlimited class of investors.178
Such a scheme echoes Rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities
Act of 1933,179 but does so in a way that is a significant improvement
over Wisconsin’s current crowdfunding exemption due to a narrower
definition of who qualifies.
Unlike the first tier of qualified investors, both the middle tier and
bottom tier will impose an aggregate cap on amounts received and a
per-investor cap on amounts contributed to any crowdfunding offering, with the goal of increasing the overall cap crowdfunding offerings
while maintaining sufficient investor protections. At the second tier
applying to certified investors, Wisconsin should apply an $8,000,000
or $10,000,000 aggregate cap on total capital raised via investments
made by certified investors, depending on whether the issuer has undergone and made available a financial audit to both investors and the
WDFI.180 In addition, each certified investor will have a $50,000 cap on
the amount of funding he or she may contribute to any single crowdfunding offering in exchange for securities within a twelve-month pe-
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riod. The third tier, which serves as a catchall for all investors not part
of the top or middle tiers, will see its ceiling raised to $4,000,000 or
$5,000,000, again depending on whether the audit requirement is fulfilled. Additionally, investors falling within the lower tier will have
their individual cap on amounts invested to any single crowdfunding
offering within a twelve-month period increased from $10,000 to
$20,000.181 Like with qualified investors, there will be no limit on the
number of investors in the middle or bottom tiers that may participate
in any crowdfunding offering. Under such a regulatory scheme, the
cap on amounts received would be theoretically unlimited as it currently is, but would raise the current cap on ordinary investors from
$1,000,000 or $2,000,000182 to $4,000,000 or $5,000,000, with up to an
additional $8,000,000 or $10,000,000 coming from certified investors.
As a result, the aggregate cap on amounts received from investors not
qualifying for exemption from the cap would increase from $1,000,000
or $2,000,000 to as much as $12,000,000 or $15,000,000, depending on
the makeup of the overall investor pool.183
Though the proposed regulatory framework is more complex in
structure than Wisconsin’s current crowdfunding exemption, it should
be adopted for two primary reasons: (1) because investor protections
need to be more accurate in terms of who is protected and the level to
which they are protected; and (2) because caps on both aggregate
amounts of capital raised and amounts contributed by individual investors as part of a crowdfunding offering need to be increased to
stimulate more widespread use of crowdfunding in Wisconsin on an
intrastate basis.

Though Wisconsin’s crowdfunding exemption requires a moderate
overhaul of its structure, definitions, and limitations, its current notice
and disclosure requirements should be maintained in the interest of
investor protection.184 As noted previously,185 Wisconsin is one of only
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181. See id. § 551.202(26)(d).
182. See id. § 551.202(26)(c).
183. Assuming that only third tier investors are involved, the cap would only increase
from $1,000,000 or $2,000,000 to $4,000,000 or $5,000,000. However, if any second tier, certified investors are involved in the offering, their presence effectively increases the cap by
$8,000,000 or $10,000,000, raising the overall cap to $12,000,000 or $15,000,000.
184. For a full discussion of Wisconsin’s notice and disclosure requirements, see discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
185. See discussion supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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a few states that requires quarterly financial reports in addition to incentivizing financial audits through a stepped-up cap186 and imposing
specific disclosure requirements to both investors and the state regulatory body.187 Such requirements become even more essential with an
increased aggregate cap and raised ceilings on individual investors, as
more money is on the line and the stakes are significantly raised.188 At
the same time, the increased ability to raise funds brought about by increased financial caps provides the issuer with more capital to apply
towards generating financial reports and making the requisite disclosures to investors and the WDFI. Doing so will allow for investors to
make better initial decisions on whether to purchase a given security,
and what to do after the initial offering and sale is completed, such as
hold, sell, or purchase more in the secondary market. Wisconsin implements its notice and disclosure requirements as applied to crowdfunding issuers properly, and should continue to do so under a modified framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
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186. See WIS. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1)(a)–(b) (2015–2016).
187. Id. § 551.205.
188. See Zeoli, supra note 173 (advocating for minimum disclosure and updating requirements imposed on issuers in the context of intrastate crowdfunding legislation).
189. See discussion supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
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As evidenced by its recent growth and development,189 crowdfunding has potential to become a more widely-spread method of capital
generation. However, in order to become a viable means of raising
funds on an intrastate basis in Wisconsin, adjustments need to be
made to the legislature’s first attempt at instituting regulations on
crowdfunding and providing an exemption for crowdfunding offerings. This article has examined the regulatory framework of the Wisconsin crowdfunding regulation in juxtaposition with basic tenants of
corresponding regulations federally and in other states, highlighted
the primary weaknesses in the current statutory schema, and provided
for potential changes that may encourage greater levels of intrastate
crowdfunding activity within Wisconsin while maintaining necessary
investor protections. Similar adjustments could be made to both the
federal crowdfunding exemption and such exemptions currently in
place in other states, and could be initially enacted in the twenty-one
states lacking a crowdfunding exemption.
It is inevitable that as time passes, technology advances, society
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evolves, and global business practices adapt and modernize to meet
the current sociocultural, technological, and economic environment.
Due to the derivative challenges and concerns that naturally flow from
such advancements, statutes must be rewritten and amended, and entirely new regulatory schema must be developed. The development of
crowdfunding has created such a challenge, and the body of law relating to crowdfunding—both within and without Wisconsin—will need
to continue to evolve to support a properly flexible regulatory scheme
while protecting the interests of individual investors. Doing so could
be a boon for small businesses and investors statewide, and may enhance the Wisconsin economy in a notoriously unstable economic era.
ANDREW S. HOVESTOL
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